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Abstract 
The large scale deployment of Wide-Area Monitoring Systems (WAMSs) could play a strategic role in 
supporting the evolution of the traditional power systems towards smarter and self healing grids. The 
correct operation of these synchronized monitoring systems requires a common and accurate timing 
reference usually provided by satellite based Global Positioning System (GPS). Although, these satellites 
signals provide timing accuracy that easily exceeds the needs of the power industry, they are extremely 
vulnerable to radiofrequency interference. Consequently a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying 
their potential vulnerabilities is of paramount importance for a correct and safe WAMSs operation. Armed 
with such a vision, this paper presents and discusses the results of an experimental analysis aimed at 
characterising the vulnerability of  GPS-based WAMSs to external interferences. The paper outlines the 
potential strategies that could be adopted to protect GPS receivers from external cyber-attacks and 
proposes decentralized defense strategies based on self organizing sensor networks aimed at assuring the 
correct time synchronization in the presence of external attacks.  
 
Keywords—Wide Area Monitoring Systems, Phasor Measurement Unit, Global Positioning System, 
Radio Frequency Interference. 
 
1. Introduction 
The complexity of modern power systems and the rising level of uncertainties in these networks might 
radically affect the required security and reliability of their operation. This is mainly due to the increasing 
level of power systems interconnections, that increases their vulnerability with respect to dynamic 
perturbations, and the constant growth of the electrical energy demand, which leads power components to 
operate closest to their thermal limits. Further uncertainties in power systems operation are induced by the 
unpredictable economic dynamics governing the energy market operators and by the increasing pervasion 
of distributed generation systems that could sensibly raise the number of power transactions.   
In this complex scenario, a significant growth of the number of dispersed generators powered by 
renewable energy sources connected to the electrical systems is expected in the near future [1,2]. This 
induces a number of side effects that should be properly managed as far as highly variable power 
injections and voltages profile perturbation are concerned. Finally, it is expected that the operational 
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environment of future power systems will becoming increasingly rigorous due to continually evolving 
functions of a power system from operation jurisdiction to control responsibly, coupled with the rising 
demand and expectation for reliability [3,4].  
In facing these problems, the large scale deployment of the Smart Grids (SGs) paradigm has been 
recognized as the most promising enabling technology.  
This emerging paradigm is based on a fusion of pervasive sensor networks, two-way high-speed 
communications, high scalable computing systems, monitoring software and related data services to get 
location-specific and real-time actionable data aimed at providing high value services for both system 
operators and end-users [5,6]. The cornerstone of the SG is the ability of distributed entities to acquire, 
process, store and share accurate and heterogeneous information. As a consequence, the development of 
reliable and flexible Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMSs) represents a crucial issue in both 
structuring and operating the SGs [7,8]. 
WAMSs are based on system-wide data processing aimed at increasing network capacity and minimizing 
wide-area disturbances. The main SGs applications that may be effectively deployed by a WAMS are [9]: 
- System Integrity Protection Schemes; 
- Distribution circuits network management; 
- Dynamical loading of power equipments; 
- System restoration and smart restoration tools; 
- Advance warning systems of impending trouble. 
WAMSs require accurate phasor and frequency information from multiple time synchronized sensors 
distributed along the power network [10,11]. Presently, Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) provide 
accurate synchronized information about voltage and current phasors, frequency and rate-of-change-of-
frequency using a high common accuracy time reference [12]. 
The adoption of WAMSs based on PMUs could allow the SGs to be operated closer to its stability limits 
by: (i) monitoring in real time the power flows in interconnected areas; (ii) identifying the power system 
dynamics and (iii) detecting inter-area oscillations [13,14,15]. As a consequence, the SGs operator could 
exploit the transmission and generation capacity more efficiently, the renewable power generators can be 
used more effectively, and the marginal cost of power generation can be reduced [16,17]. 
Anyway, to realize these benefits, several open problems need to be addressed. 
In particular, the correct operation of PMUs requires a common and accurate timing signal that should be 
generated by a reliable synchronizing source and referenced to the Coordinated Universal Time [18,19]. 
This signal must be available without interruption at all PMUs locations and it should satisfy specific 
requirements in terms of availability and reliability. Moreover, it should be accurate enough to allow the 
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PMUs to be synchronized with an accuracy suitable to keep the Total Vector Error1 within one percent 
[20]. To address these needs, satellite-based timing signals are frequently adopted. These signals provide 
global absolute time reference which is characterized by a global coverage and an extremely high timing 
accuracy [21,22]. On the other hand, they greatly rely on information transfer over air communications 
media. This wireless nature of communications links and the weak power levels of satellite signals make 
them vulnerable to radiofrequency interference. As a consequence, any electromagnetic radiation source 
emitting radio signals in the satellite signals frequency bands could affect the correct PMUs 
synchronization and, consequently, the overall WAMS  operation [23]. The occurrence of this kind of 
disruption mechanism could be not infrequent in future SGs which are considered strategic infrastructures 
potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks and external interference [24]. 
Consequently a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying the potential satellite-based PMUs’ 
vulnerabilities and the main strategies that could be adopted to protect the satellite receivers from external 
RFI attacks is of paramount importance for a correct and safe SGs operation. 
In addressing these needs, this paper presents the results of an experimental analysis aimed at 
characterizing the vulnerability of a GPS-based PMU to external RFI external cyber attacks. The PMU 
adopted in this study is the SEL 421 equipped by a high performance GPS receiver. This is an advanced 
protection, automation, and control system for high-speed distance and directional protection developed by 
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories. Several attack scenarios were simulated, and the impact on the PMU 
operation have been assessed. Starting from these results, the paper analyzes the main strategies that could 
be adopted to protect GPS receivers from RFI attacks and explores the possibility of decentralizing the 
WAMS synchronization functions on a network of interactive PMUs equipped by distributed consensus 
protocols [25]. This decentralized synchronization paradigm could be activated in the case of a GPS 
unavailability since it doesn't require neither explicit point-to-point message passing nor routing protocols. 
It spreads information across the wide area communication network by updating each PMU timing signal 
by a weighted average of its neighbors. Thanks to this feature the PMUs can synchronize their local 
acquisitions without the need for a synchronization infrastructure.  
 
2. Elements of Synchronized SGs Monitoring 
Recent advances in Information and Communications Technology are leading to significant enhancements 
in the context of synchronized and wide area SGs monitoring. A wide spectrum of advanced technologies 
and methodologies will support the evolution of traditional monitoring frameworks toward self healing and 
                                                          
1 It is the magnitude of the vector difference between the phasor estimated by the PMU and its theoretical value expressed in percentage of the theoretical 
value. 
 4 
 
 
self organizing architectures composed by distributed and cooperative entities. In this domain the large 
scale deployment of WAMSs has been recognized as one of the most promising enabling technology. 
WAMSs integrate pervasive sensor networks, advanced data processing tools and wide area 
communication systems. They aim at enhancing the conventional functions of existing Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition systems by enabling real-time wide area situational awareness [26]. This is 
obtained by acquiring and processing synchronized measurements aimed at classifying the current SG 
operation state and detecting incipient faults [27]. To this aim, WAMSs require reliable and accurate 
phasor and frequency measurements from a proper number of power system buses. This can be obtained 
by deploying a network of time synchronized PMUs aimed at measuring the voltage phasor (magnitude 
and phase) at the installed buses and the current phasors in all the branches incident to these buses [19]. 
These phasor information are collected by the PMUs, forwarded to the phasor data concentrators and 
transmitted to the monitoring centre. At this level the data processing and storage applications can be run 
directly. These applications depend by the number and locations of the PMUs and in particular: 
– If a limited number of PMUs are available, WAMS data processing can only partially describe the 
SG operation state. In this case the typical applications include: 
 Voltage stability monitoring for transmission corridors; 
 FACTS control using feedback from remote PMU measurements. 
– On the contrary, more advanced applications based on a detailed network model view can be 
implemented including2 [28]: 
 Loadability calculation based on OPF studies; 
 Topology detection and state estimation; 
 Distribution circuits network management; 
 System restoration and smart restoration tools; 
 Advance warning systems of impending trouble. 
These applications allow the WAMSs to evolve toward the so called Wide Area Measurements 
Protective and Control Systems (WAMPACs).  
To implement these functions PMUs require a common and accurate timing reference determining the 
instant at which the waveforms of the buses voltages and currents are sampled. This may be obtained by 
synchronising the PMUs clocks to the coordinated universal time by a common timing reference. The 
latter should be available without interruption at all measurement locations and characterised by a degree 
of availability, reliability, and accuracy satisfying proper requirements [19]. 
To address these needs the employment of Satellite based timing signals has been widely adopted for 
                                                          
2 It is worth nothing that each specific WAMS application requires that a proper number of PMUs are strategically located into the SG. 
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PMUs synchronization. The main benefits arising by the application of the Satellite technology is that it 
does not require the deployment of primary time and time dissemination systems assuring, at the same 
time, a set of intrinsic advantages as far as wide area coverage, easy access to remote sites and adaptable to 
changing network patterns are concerned. 
On the other hand, Satellite-based synchronization signals rely on information transfer over air 
communications media which makes them vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional radiofrequency 
interference. Any electromagnetic radiation source can act as an interference source if it can emit potential 
radio signals in the satellite signals frequency bands [19]. 
Consequently the research for reliable and effective synchronization techniques aimed at providing 
redundant PMUs timing signals is of paramount importance for a correct and safe WAMS operation. These 
“back-up systems” come into effect in the case of a GPS unavailability providing a more reliable timing 
source.  Furthermore, if one signal is degraded or unavailable, the PMU should still operate within overall 
system requirements. 
 
3. Vulnerability Analysis of Satellite based WAMSs 
The deployment of satellite-based timing signals has been widely explored in wide area synchronized 
monitoring. Many technologies are currently available for WAMSs synchronization; the most common is 
based on GPS signal processing. GPS is based on a constellation of 24 satellites and it is steered by a 
ground-based cesium clock ensemble that itself is referenced to UTC. Each GPS satellite is identified by 
the PRN code it transmits and broadcasts a spread-spectrum waveform on two carrier frequencies at 
1575.42 MHz and 1227.6 MHz providing a correction to UTC time that the receiver automatically applies 
to the outputs [22]. Thanks to this continuous adjustment, the timing accuracy is limited only by short-term 
signal reception whose basic accuracy is 0.2 microseconds. The inherent availability, redundancy, 
reliability, and accuracy make GPS signal processing a technological solution well suited for synchronized 
WAMSs [20,21]. 
A further technological option potentially suitable for synchronized SGs monitoring is represented by the 
INMARSAT system satellites. They will carry a GPS-like transponder broadcasting signals that will be 
similar to existing GPS transmissions. As a consequence, it can be used with slightly modified GPS 
receivers.  
The European Space Agency (ESA) GALILEO system is the third global satellite time and navigation 
system to come on line. It comprises a constellation of 30 satellites divided among three circular orbits at 
an altitude of 23222 km to cover the Earth’s entire surface. Galileo will have an integrity signal to ensure 
the quality of the signals received and to inform the user immediately of any error. The GALILEO time 
 6 
 
 
precision in terms of time errors (95% confidence) for different signals range from 0.7-8.1 ns [29]. 
Although these satellite based synchronization technologies provide timing accuracy that easily exceeds 
the needs of the power industry, they can be vulnerable to both intentional or unintentional interferences 
that could hinder the correct operation of the WAMS. In details, the disruption mechanisms that could 
trigger these phenomena can be classified as:  
– Ionospheric effects: the sunspot activity causes an increase in the solar flux, charged particles and 
electromagnetic rays emitted from the Sun. This natural process could sensibly affect the transit 
time of satellite signals through the ionosphere. As a consequence, the satellite receiver of the PMU 
may experience degraded performance in tracking of the satellites due to scintillations, rapidly 
varying amplitude and phase of the satellite signal. The equatorial and high latitude regions are 
most severely affected by this increased ionospheric activity [30,31]. 
– Unintentional Interference: since satellite signals travel through the upper regions of earth’s 
atmosphere, they can be influenced by solar disturbances. In addition, when there will be restricted 
lines of sight to satellites (as for example in urban areas or near foliage) the overall quality of the 
synchronization signal could sensibly deteriorate for short or long term. In this case, it is important 
to have a reliable estimation of the timing signals availability [31].  
– Radio Frequency Interference: any electronic equipment radiating in the satellites frequency band 
represents a potential source of interference. Although transmitter equipments are designed to not 
interfere with the wireless telecommunication signals, they can radiate at the same frequency as the 
satellite signals if they are faulty or badly operated. These interferences, if powerful enough, lead 
the satellite receiver of the PMU to badly receive the timing signals [30]. 
– Intentional Interference: satellite based timing signals are extremely weak and they can be 
deliberately jammed by radio interference. The occurrence of this event could be not infrequent in 
future SGs which are considered strategic infrastructures potentially exposed to external attacks. 
In the authors opinion, intentional interference represents one of the most serious problems to address 
amongst these disruption mechanisms. This kind of cyber attack has not so far explored in the WAMSs 
literature although its consequences could be very dramatic for the overall SG operation. In fact, all the 
main WAMS functions could be seriously compromised if the installed PMUs lose their synchronization 
signals. PMUs flag the time synchronization conditions to disable the protection and control systems. A 
comprehensive analysis of the potential cyber attack scenarios is therefore essential in order to try and 
reduce this risk. 
4. Experimental Studies 
This section presents the results of an intensive experimental activity aimed at characterising the potential 
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vulnerabilities of a satellite based PMU to external jamming signals. The test set-up adopted in our 
experiments is schematically depicted in fig.1. The device under test is the SEL 421. The PMU has been 
interfaced with a Human Machine Interface computer and synchronized by a high performance Satellite-
Synchronized time source. To this aim a SEL 2407 equipped by an active bullet antenna (5 V 40 dB gain) 
has been adopted. This device generates demodulated IRIG-B outputs with ±100 ns accuracy meeting the 
requirements for precise-timing applications and exceeding the IEEE C37.90 and IEC 60255 protective 
relay standards.  
In order to analyze the signal received by the GPS antenna, a DC blocking splitter has been adopted. It 
allows us to divide the GPS signal in two signal paths. 
The first signal path is sent directly to the satellite-synchronized clock. This signal allows the satellite-
synchronized clock to power the antenna. The second signal path is processed by a GPS amplifier and sent 
to a spectrum analyzer (namely, the Rohde&Schwarz FSP30). This signal is connected to the DC block 
port of the power splitter combiner.  
The external cyber-attacks have been generated by a vector signal generator (namely, the Rohde&Schwarz 
SMIQ03B) equipped by a broadband disturbance antenna (namely, the Rohde&Schwarz HL040). The 
disturbance antenna has been located 5 meters from the GPS antenna. The main features characterising the 
RF components have been summarised in table I. 
Vector Signal 
Generator 
Substation
HMI Computer
DC Blocking 
Power Splitter
Spectrum 
Analyzer  
GPS 
Amplifier
SEL-2407
SEL-421
 
Fig.1: The experimental setup 
 
The first experimental activity aimed at characterising the actual signal received by the satellite-
synchronized time source without any external perturbations. The measured GPS signal spectrum in the L1 
band is reported in fig.2. 
The spectrum analyzer measured the noise floor at about -80 dBm with a 30 kHz RBW. The measured 
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signal spectral hump is about 5 dBm. 
These data are consistent with those obtained in similar experiments reported in the satellite literature [32]. 
They demonstrate the good level of the GPS signal received by the satellite-synchronized time source. 
Table I: Main features of the RF components 
DC Blocking RF Splitter Combiner 
Frequency Range 700 - 2700 MHz 
Impedance 50 OHMS 
Insertion Loss (max): 0.4 dB (ABOVE 3.01 dB SPLIT) 
Amplitude Balance (max): 0.2 dB 
Phase Balance (max): 3 Degrees 
VSWR (max): 1.20 : 1 (IN), 1.20 : 1 (OUT) 
GPS Amplifier 
Frequency Range 1200-1600 MHz  
Gain 32 dB 
Noise Figure 0.95 dB 
OIP3 31 dBm 
P1dB 17 dBm 
VSWR 1.5:1 (IN), 1.9:1 (OUT) 
Disturbance Antenna 
Frequency Range 400 MHz to 3.6 GHz 
Polarization Linear 
Input impedance 50 Ω 
VSWR <2.5, typ. <2.0 
Max. input power 150 W to 50 W CW 
Gain 5 dBi to 7 dBi 
 
 
Fig.2: The GPS signal spectrum processed by the Satellite-Synchronized time source without any external perturbation. 
 
To assess the impact of external cyber-attacks on the PMU synchronization, further experiments were 
conducted. To this aim, we considered several attack scenarios. In the first one we generated a sinusoidal 
jamming signal and we checked the impact of this disturbance on the PMU synchronization for several 
signal frequencies and power. The obtained results are summarised in fig. 3 and 4. In details, Fig. 3 shows 
the spectrum of the signal processed by the satellite-synchronized time source in the presence of a 
sinusoidal jamming signal. The corresponding impacts of the sinusoidal jamming signal on the PMU 
synchronization for different frequency and power values are reported in fig. 4. 
Analysing these data it is worth observing that the PMU only lost its synchronization during the 4th attack 
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(characterized by a signal frequency of 1576.2 MHz and a signal power of -40 dBm) and the 5th attack 
(characterised by a signal  frequency of 1576 MHz and a signal power of -26 dBm)3.  
 
 
Fig.3: The GPS signal spectrum processed by the Satellite-Synchronized time source in the presence of a sinusoidal Jamming 
signal 
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Fig.4: Impact of a sinusoidal jamming signal on the PMU synchronization 
 
In the second attack scenario, the effect of a digital jamming signal on the PMU synchronization has been 
assessed. In particular the jamming signal adopted in this experiment is characterized by a carrier 
frequency of 1575 MHz (L1 band) modulated by a Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) code. The effect of 
this disturbance on the PMU synchronization has been experimentally assessed. The obtained results are 
summarized in fig. 5 and 6. In particular, fig.5 shows the spectrum of the signal processed by the satellite-
synchronized time source in the presence of the BPSK jamming signal while fig.6 shows the impacts of the 
BPSK jamming signal on the PMU synchronization for different signal powers. 
By analyzing these data it is important to emphasize that the PMU lost synchronization only during the 
first attack (characterized by a jamming signal power of -40 dBm). Therefore, we can argue that this value 
                                                          
3 It is important to emphasize that -40 dBm corresponds to a signal power of about 100nW. 
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represents the lower power threshold for a modulated jamming signal in the L1 band. 
This conclusion has been also confirmed by further experimental results obtained by using different 
modulation techniques. 
 
 
Fig. 5: The GPS signal spectrum processed by the Satellite-Synchronized time source in the presence of a BPSK Jamming 
signal 
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Fig.6: Impact of a BPSK jamming signal on PMU synchronization 
 
5. Possible Countermeasures Against External Attacks 
The defense strategies that could be adopted to protect satellite-based WAMSs from cyber-attacks are 
based on the general principle of raising the power levels required by the jammers to interfere with the 
receivers. The latter makes the cyber-attack unsustainable in terms of the energy required to run, or easily 
detectable. 
To implement this defense paradigm several mitigation techniques could be deployed. They include [19]: 
– The employment of a “Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna” aimed at determining the direction 
of the attack source and modifying its reception pattern to filter signals received from that 
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direction; 
– The implementation of a narrowband interference processing aimed at measuring the frequency of 
the attack signal and then ignore it. This technique only works well when the frequency band of the 
attack signal is much narrower than that of the satellite signal; 
– The adoption of a jamming signal to thermal noise ‘powermeter’ that measures the total amount of 
power received by the antenna. Based on the amount of power expected from thermal noise, it 
estimates the amount of received jamming power. In this way, the receiver can monitor the 
likelihood of becoming jammed and inform the user of its reliability [23].  
Other mitigation paradigms consist in physically shielding the satellite receiver’s antenna from 
interference sources. These approaches may be useful only under some circumstances since they require a-
priori knowledge of the attack source location.  
Further countermeasures are based on the redundancy of the synchronization source.  In this context the 
employment of local oscillators (i.e. quartz or rubidium oscillators) and/or multiple (complementary) 
timing signals have been proposed as possible solution strategies [33,34]. These “back-up systems” come 
into effect in the case of signals unavailability providing a more reliable timing source.  Furthermore, if 
one signal is degraded, the receiver should still operate within overall system requirements. A promising 
solution in this field is the ensemble time base generation, in which various weighting factors based upon 
the predicted or measured accuracy and stability of various different time sources are taken into account to 
provide a disciplined time scale generator. 
Anyway, in the author opinions, the identification for more effective strategies aimed at reducing the 
vulnerability of satellite based WAMSs to external attacks in a SGs context is still embryonic and needs 
both theoretical and practical improvements. In this domain, the most promising enabling technologies 
include [35]: 
– The conceptualization of decentralized paradigms aimed at distributing the synchronization 
function at PMUs level; 
– The deployment of pervasive communication networks aimed at allowing PMUs to communicate 
with remote centers, with other PMUs and with all the systems at substation level. 
These technologies suggest a shift towards decentralized and self healing synchronizing architectures for 
WAMSs. In addressing this need the large scale deployment of cooperative and self organizing smart 
sensor networks could play a strategic role.  
 
6. Toward a Self Healing Synchronized Architecture 
The recent advances in bio-inspired computing and self organizing sensor networks have opened the door 
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for reliable and cost effective technologies for decentralized information processing and data analysis. This 
is mainly due to broad application of distributed decision making in coordinating networks of dynamic 
agents aimed at enhancing operational effectiveness in networked autonomous systems [25]. 
Armed with such a vision in this section we explore the possibility of decentralizing the WAMS 
synchronization functions on a network of interactive PMUs equipped by distributed consensus protocols 
[25]. The idea is to start from the information spreading theory for coordinating a networks of cooperative 
smart PMUs [36,37]. The synchronized functions are executed by equipping each PMU by a dynamical 
system (oscillator) initialized by local information. The oscillators of nearby PMU are mutually coupled by 
proper local coupling strategies derived from the mathematics of populations of mutually coupled 
oscillators [38]. This bio-inspired paradigm allows all the PMU to reach consensus on general functions of 
the variables sensed by all the PMUs. Thanks to this feature, the local sensor acquisitions can be time 
synchronized and each PMU can compute the most important variables characterizing the global power 
grid operation without the need for a fusion centre.  
In details we assumed that the local clock of the i th  PMU is described by the following linear equation: 
( )i i it t     (1) 
Where i  is the value of the local clock while i  and i  are the skew and offset coefficients respectively. 
Since the value of the reference time is not available at the i th  PMU, it is not possible to directly 
compute these coefficients. 
To address this issue we focused on the Average Time Syncronization protocols (ATS) [39], which are a 
class of distributed algorithms based on the average consensus theory.  
The idea is to extract indirect information on the unknown clock parameters of the i th  PMU by 
measuring the time offsets with its neighbors and to synchronize all the PMUs to the following virtual 
reference clock: 
( )v v vt t    (2) 
According to this paradigm, each PMU tries to estimate the unknown clock parameters by a linear 
regression of its local clock: 
( )i i it t   
 (3) 
Where i  and i

are the skew and the offset estimation respectively. These parameters are estimated by a 
local exchange of information between the PMUs according to distributed consensus protocols [31,39]. In 
particular, when the dynamical systems synchronize, all PMUs will have a common global reference time, 
namely:  
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lim 1,...,t i vi N    (4) 
and, by observing that: 
( )i i i i i it t       
  (5) 
It results: 
limt i i v   (6) 
limt i i i v     
 (7) 
These equations demonstrate as the PMUs can be time synchronized by adapting their clocks according to 
local coupling strategies without the need for any cluster header. When this network of coupled oscillator 
clocks synchronize, then each clock will show the same value, without changing the value once reached. 
Thanks to this feature, the built in PMUs oscillators are able to lock to a common phase, despite the 
differences in the frequencies of the individual clocks.  
This decentralized paradigm raises the synchronization redundancy by assuring the time synchronization 
of the PMUs also in the case of an unavailability of the primary timing signals.  
Intense experimental activities aimed at characterizing the actual performances of this solution on real 
power networks are currently under development by the authors. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The correct operation of synchronized WAMS requires a common and accurate timing reference. This is 
typically obtained by equipping the remote PMUs by a satellite based synchronization system. Although 
this technological solution provides timing accuracy that exceeds the needs of the power industry, it is 
extremely vulnerable to radiofrequency interferences.  
Amongst the possible disruption mechanisms that could threaten the correct operation of satellite based 
systems for WAMSs synchronization, the intentional cyber attack represents one of the most serious 
problems to address.  
This paper presented an experimental analysis aimed at characterizing the potential attack scenarios and 
the main vulnerabilities of a satellite based PMU to jamming signals. The obtained results have shown that 
the proper frequency, power and shape of the jamming signal could lead the PMU to lose its 
synchronization. If this event is not properly managed, it could compromise the correct operation of the 
overall WAMS. To avoid or mitigate this risk it is necessary to adopt suitable strategies aimed at raising 
the power levels required by the jammer signal to compromise the correct system operation. This 
requirement makes the attack too expensive, unsustainable in terms of the power required, and easily 
detectable and therefore readily intercepted. In this scenario the deployment of decentralized and self 
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healing synchronization architectures based on cooperative sensor networks represents one of the most 
promising research direction aimed at reducing the vulnerability of satellite based WAMSs to external 
cyber-attacks. 
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